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SECURED TRANSACTIONS (OTHER THAN
REAL ESTATE MORTGAGES)-
A COMPARISON OF THE LAW IN WASHINGTON
AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,
ARTICLE 9*
WARREN L SHATTUCK*
Section 9-401. Place of Filing; Erroneous Filing; Removal of Collateral.
(1) If filing is required by this Article (subsection (1) of Section 9-
302) in order to perfect a security interest, the place of filing is as follows:
(a) when the collateral is accounts other than those arising from the
sale of farm products by a farmer, chattel paper, contract rights,
inventory or equipment other than equipment used in farming
operations, then in the office of the [Secretary of State] [and in'
addition if all of the debtor's places of business are in a single
county, in the office of the ...... in that county];
(b) when the collateral is consumer goods, equipment used in farm-
ing operations, farm products, or accounts arising from the sale
of farm products by a farmer, then in the office of the ...... in
the county of the debtor's residence or if the debtor is not a
resident of this State then in the office of the ...... in the
county where the goods are kept, and in addition when the
collateral is crops in the office of the ...... in the county where
the land on which the crops are growing or to be grown is
located;
(c) when the collateral is goods which are or are to be so affixed to
realty as to be a part thereof, then in the office where a mortgage
on the realty concerned would be filed or recorded.
This subsection locates the place for filing by reference to the type
of property, which is in-turn governed by the classification of the debtor
as consumer, farmer or otherwiseY.17 The Code therefore contemplates
central filing where the debtor is engaged in business and county filing
where he is not so engaged, a system which seems to be a compromise.
The Comment points out the advantages to credit agencies of centrally
* Continued from last issue.
* Professor of Law, University of Washington.
276 The operation of this subsection is regulated by §§ 9-105, 9-106 and 9-109, which
provide definitions of the different types of property and so inform us when filing is
central and when in the county. The additional classification which would exist were
the suggested (bracketed) provision for county filing enacted might well be more
confusing than otherwise.
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located records which facilitate state-wide search on behalf of clients
who are interested at a given time in customers located all over the
state. The Comment also notes the natural inclination to search locally
where the debtor is a consumer or farmer.
The Code system makes much more sense than do the present Wash-
ington statutes. These locate the place for filing by reference to the
type of security transaction, a method for which no logical explanation
can be advanced." When this emphasis on types of security transac-
tion is coupled with propositions which permit the existence of am-
biguity concerning the category into which a particular transaction
falls, a trap for lenders results.17 1 It is a trap which can cost him his
security even though no one was misled or harmed by the filing which
was actually made. On the other hand a person who undertakes a
thorough title check on a chattel must now look for both chattel mort-
gage and conditional sale filing, and in the secretary of state's records
as well as those of one or more counties.' The effort entailed in
accomplishing filing and in searching the records would be consider-
ably eased were the Code enacted, and the risk of error would be much
diminished. Occasional difficulty in deciding where to file or search
would no doubt be experienced under the Code; the problem ought not
be a serious one. 80
In designating for all instances of local filing a common test for
locating the right county, the Code strikes down one of the useless
differences which characterize the existing law.18' In selecting the
county of the debtor's residence as the place, rather than the county
where the chattel was when the transaction was undertaken, the Code
has picked the county which a prospective record searcher can ascer-
tain with greater assurance, and the place where the ordinary prospec-
177 RCW 61.04.020 (chattel mortgages; filing in the county where the chattel was
when the mortgage was executed is mandatory; secretary of state filing is a permis-
sive additional step aimed to provide a method for escaping the operation of RCW
61.04.090, which requires filing in the new county if the chattel is removed from the
original one) ; RCW 61.20.130 (trust receipts; secretary of state filing) ; RCW 63.-
12.010 (conditional sale contracts; filing in the county where the vendee resided when
the vendee took possession of the chattel; there is no provision for central filing);
RCW 63.16.010(6) (accounts receivable; secretary of state filing).
178 What the security holder believes to be a conditional sale may be a chattel
mortgage, or vice versa. The cases are discussed in note 6 supra.
179 This is so, quite apart from the complications produced by RCW 61.04.090, and
its requirement of refiling upon removal of the chattel to a new county.
180 When it does arise, the existence of the problem should be manifest. Filing or
searching in both places would be the cautious practice where there is doubt.
181 See note 177 supra.
(AUG.
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tive buyer or creditor is more apt to expect to have to search." 2 A
problem which has complicated the Washington conditi6nal sale statute,
i.e. does "residence" mean "domicile," is not solved by the Code. 8
That security in crops shall bd protected by filing in the county
wherein the land is situated is a familiar requirement."". The Code
demand for filing both there and in the county of the debtor's residence
would be a change.
Part (c) states an obvious proposition for goods which are to be
affixed to land. The present statutes are not different."8
(2) A filing which is made in good faith in an improper place or not
in all of the places required by this section is nevertheless effective with
regard to any collateral as to which the filing was proper and with regard
to all collateral against any person who has knowledge of the filing of a
financing statement which indicates that a security interest in all collateral
wherever located was intended.
There seems to be no local decision testing the effectiveness of filing
which in part conformed to the controlling statute and in part did not,
or considering the consequences of actual knowledge of incorrect filing.
The Code solutions appear sensible enough.
(3) A filing which is made in the proper place in this state remains
effective even though the debtor's residence or place of business or the
location of the collateral is thereafter changed
[Altermaive provision: A filing which is made in the proper county
in this state remains effective for one hundred and twenty days
after the debtor's residence or place of business or the location
of the collateral is changed to another county of this state but
becomes ineffective thereafter unless a copy of the financing
statement signed by the secured party is filed in the new county
within said period.]
This subsection and its alternate pose a question of policy for which
182 Experience under the chattel mortgage statute in Washington has demonstrated
the unreliability of chattel-location as a determinant of filing. See Muller v. Bardshar,
119 Wash. 252, 205 Pac. 845 (1922), discussed in note 10 supra. Tracing the past
residences of the debtor is apt to be a much more certain process than tracing the past
locations of the chattel. Checking filings is at best an operation difficult to carry
through with assurance that nothing has been overlooked.
18 See First Nat. Bank v. Wilcox, 72 Wash. 473, 130 Pac. 756, 131 Pac. 203 (1913);
Bucknor-Weatherby Co. v. Wuest, 167 Wash. 647, 9 P2d 1104 (1932). These cases
are discussed in note 12 rupra.
18s Since crops will be in the county where the land is, the Washington statute in
effect requires filing where the land is situated. RCW 61.04.020.
188 RCW 61.04.040 (chattel mortgages); RCW 63.12.020 (conditional sale con-
tracts).
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the present Washington statutes provide conflicting answers.188 In
weighing the alternatives it should be remembered that the Code con-
tains no provision under which filing in the new county can be avoided,
as to consumer goods and farm equipment, by the sort of central filing
permitted by the present Washington chattel mortgage statute.'87
If filing in this state becomes necessary under Section 9-103, parts
(a) and (b) of this section will govern the place.
(4) When collateral is brought into this state from another jurisdiction,
the rules stated in Section 9-103 apply to determine when filing is
necessary in this state.
This subsection requires no discussion.
Section 9-402. Formal Requisites of Financing Statement.
(1) A financing statement is sufficient if it is signed by the debtor and
the secured party, gives an address of the secured party from which in-
formation concerning the security interest may be obtained, gives a mail-
ing address of the debtor and contains a statement indicating the types,
or describing the items, of property covered. When the collateral is crops
growing or to be grown or goods affixed or to be affixed to realty so as
to be a part thereof the statement must also contain a description of the
land or realty concerned. A copy of the security agreement is sufficient
as a financing statement if it contains the above information and is signed
by both parties. When the collateral is goods affixed or to be affixed to
realty, the collateral must be described by item and not by type.
(2) A financing statement which otherwise complies with subsection
(1) is sufficient although it is signed only by the secured party when it is
filed to perfect a security interest in
(a) collateral already subject to a security interest in another juris-
diction when it is brought into this state. Such a financing
statement must state that the collateral was brought into this
state under such circumstances.
(b) proceeds under Section 9-306(1), if the security interest in the
original collateral was perfected. Such a financing statement
must describe the original collateral
(3) A form substantially as follows is sufficient to comply with sub-
section (1):
186 RCW 61.04.090 imperils any chattel mortgage if the property is removed from
the original county for longer than thirty days, provided there is no filing with the
secretary of state. The conditional sale statute, RCW 63.16.010 et seq., contains no
comparable provisions.
187 RCW 61.04.020.
[AUG.
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N am e of debtor (or assignor) ..............................................................................
A dd ress: ................................................................................................................
N am e of secured party (or assignee) ................................................................
A ddress: ................................................................................................................
1. This financing statement covers the following types [or items] of
property:
(list)
2. [If collateral is crops] The above listed crops are grown or are to
be grown on: (describe land)
3. [If collateral is goods affixed or to be affixed to realty] The above
described goods are affixed or to be affixed to:
(describe realty)
4. [If proceeds or products of collateral are claimed.] The following
(proceeds) (products) of the property are also covered:
(list)
(Signature of Debtor or Assignor)
(Signature of Secured Party or Assignee)
Under the traditional recording statute, a copy of the security docu-
ment, executed with various formalities and describing the specific
property covered, must be handed to the recording official for filing
or recording. The Washington chattel mortgage and conditional sale
contract statutes are examples."' 8 Since each statutory formality, as
well as the property and debt description details, can be badly handled
by the draftsman, and since any departure from perfection can be
argued to invalidate the filing, such statutes have produced a great
mass of technical and confused case law.8 All too often the court has
lost sight of the fundamental fact that filing is solely a way of con-
veying information, and not an end in itself.
The Uniform Trust Receipts Act introduced "notice filing," the
gist of which is that filing shall serve to inform about the possibility
of a security interest in a certain type of assets owned by a specific
person.190 Armed with this information, the record-searcher can obtain
such additional details as he desires by inquiry. The Washington
accounts receivable statute adopted this principle. 1" Notice filing has
1ss RCW 61.04.020 requires, for a chattel mortgage, signing, acknowledgment,
affidavit of good faith; RCW 63.12.010 requires, for a conditional sale contract, signing
by both parties, and "a memorandum of the sale stating its terms and conditions, in-
cluding the rate of interest and the purchase price exclusive of interest, insurance,
and all other charges."
189 The cases are discussed in notes 24, 31, and 32, supra.
190 RCW 61.20.130.
181 RCW 63.16.010 et seq.
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worked well. It permits the use of a simple filing form, diminishes
the quantity of material going into the public records, and permits
multiple and successive transactions under one filing. Although these
are factors of greatest significance in commercial financing, they are
not unimportant in other situations.
Since notice filing contemplates access to the records through the
medium of names, ascertainment and use in the documents of the
right names would be as important under the Code as it is now. 1" "
The Code uses the basic idea of notice filing, with refinements. The
absence of any requirement for debt description will please those
lenders who like to treat their terms and interest rates as classified
information. The Code permits (but does not require) the filing of
a copy of the security agreement. This detail is significant mostly
because the security agreement will contain a description of the par-
ticular property covered. "2 Where a financing statement is filed,
persons interested in specific property as well as in the current amount
of the secured obligation, are obliged to ascertain this data. A method
for their doing so is provided in Section 9-208.1192
The sufficiency of the property description required for chattels
designed to be affixed to land will be tested by Section 9-110.
Although a financing statement can describe the collateral in terms
of types of property, it seems likely that the use of more detailed and
specific descriptions would become the practice, where the subject
matter lends itself to the method (consumer goods and equipment, for
instance), were the Code enacted. Where property is to be described
191a See JONES, CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES § 2 47a, 986; note 7
N.C.L. REv. 328; note 11 VA. L. REv. 140. Erroneous and fictitious name problems have
not often come to the Washington appellate court. See Harrison v. National Cash Reg-
ister Co., 196 Wash. 83, 82 P.2d 136 (1938) holding that filing in the name of "The Gay
Way Restaurant" was ineffective; an inference in the opinion that the contrary might
have been held had the assumed name statute been conformed to must not be accepted
uncritically. See also Anderson Buick Co. v. Cook, 7 Wn.2d 632, 110 P.2d 857
(1941); Farmers & Mechanics Bank v. Western Loan & Building Co., 103 Wash. 349,
174 Pac. 1 (1918).
There are two recent trust receipt cases from other jurisdictions which merit noting
here: In re Nickulas, 117 F. Supp. 590 (D.Md. 1954) (sustaining filing where the
statement was signed, "Manor Sales, by Francis A. Nickulas," the trustee being
Francis A. Nickulus, an individual trading as Manor Sales Furniture Store) ; General
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Haley, 329 Mass. 559, 109 N.E.2d 143 (1952) (denying
the validity of filing where the statement was signed "E. R. Millen Trustee," the
trustee was designated in the statement as "E. R. Millen Company," and the actual
name of the trustee was "E. R. Millen Co., Inc.").
192 § 9-203 so provides.
192a The Comment to § 9-208 explains that the requirement for inquiry by the
debtor is designed to protect all concerned from improper third-party inquiries.
[AuG. •
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by types, accuracy and completeness in designating the types are
probably vital.9
Section 9-403.. What Constitutes Filing; Duration of Filing; Effect of
Lapsed. Filing; Duties of Filing'Officer.
(1) Presentation for filing of a financing statement and tender of the
filing fee or acceptance of the statement by the filing officer constitutes
filing under this Article.
This subsection conforms to the trust receipts and accounts re-
ceivable statutes. 9' The point has apparently not come to litigation
in Washington. The advantages of a positive rule are obvious.
(2) A filed financing statement which states the maturity date of the
obligation secured is effective until that date and thereafter until it lapses
under subsection (3). Any other filed financing statement is effective
until it lapses under subsection (3). Upon such lapse or upon the filing
of a statement of termination under Section 9-404, the security interest
becomes unperfected with regard to rights which accrue thereafter.
The idea that filing shall not endure forever is a familiar one.195 The
Code would effect some changes in details, but no radical departures."
The stated consequences of a lapse in the filing would be a change.""
193 The potential for trouble on this detail is exemplified in a trust receipts case,
In re San Clemente Electric Supply, 101 F. Supp. 252 (S.D.Cal. 1951) (denying the
validity of filing where the statement recited "Radios, stoves, washers, refrigerators,
ice boxes and other gas and electrical equipment," and the property in question was
water softeners).
194 RCW 61.20.120 (4) (trust receipts) ; RCW 63.16.050 (accounts receivable).
195 RCW 61.04.040 (chattel mortgages; filing ceases to be constructive notice two
years after debt matures, unless there be refiling); RCW 61.20.130 (4) (trust re-
ceipts; transactions effected within one year of filing are protected; refiling for a like
period permitted); RCW 63.16.060 (accounts receivable; protects assignments made
within three years of filing; refiling permitted). The conditional sale statute contains
no comparable provision.
195The Washington chattel mortgage statute flatly limits the duration of filing,
without regard to any recitals in the mortgage. The statute, in instructing the auditor
to index by a record containing a column headed "When due," seems to contemplate
that the mortgage will state the maturity date. RCW 61.04.030. Many do not and
there is no decision testing the sufficiency of a mortgage which says nothing about
the maturity.
197 The chattel mortgage statute, RCW 61.04.040, says that filing "shall cease to
be notice as against creditors of the mortgagor and subsequent purchasers and mort-
gagees in good faith after the expiration of the time such mortgage becomes due, unless
before the expiration of two years after the time the mortgage becomes due, the
mortgagee... makes and files an affidavit" and so forth. It has been construed to give
priority to a mortgage given during the two year period,, no renewal affidavit having
been filed. Best v. Felger, 77 Wash. 115, 137 Pac. 334 (1913). Although this con-
struction seems patently erroneous, the case has not as yet been overruled. In Othello
State Bank v. Case Thresh. Mach. Co., 113 Wash. 680,'194 Pac. 563 (1921), the
intervening mortgage was taken with knowledge of the earlier one, and was on that
ground denied priority. Farmers State Bank of Lind v. McCulley, 113 Wash. 364,
233 Pac. 661 (1925), reached a like result.
The position of creditors under the statute is unclear. In Cardwell v. Ruchert, 187
1954]
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(3) At any time after the maturity date stated in a financing statement,
or at any time after five years from the date of filing a financing state-
ment which states no maturity date, a filing officer may notify a secured
party at his address given in the statement that the effectiveness of the
statement will lapse unless a continuation statement has been filed not
later than sixty (60) days following the date of notification. Any such
continuation statement shall be signed by the secured party, shall identify
the original statement by file number and shall state that the original
statement is still effective. Upon timely filing of the continuation state-
ment, the effectiveness of the original statement shall be continued for
five years. At any time after five years from the date of filing a continua-
tion statement the filing officer may again proceed under this subsection.
Unless a statute on disposition of public records provides otherwise, the
filing officer may remove a lapsed statement from the files and destroy it
and the index.
(4) A filing officer shall mark each statement with a consecutive file
number and with the date and hour of filing and shall hold the statement
for public inspection. In addition the filing officer shall index the state-
ments according to the names of the debtor and the secured party and
shall note in the index the file number and the addresses of debtor and
secured party given in the statement.
(5) The filing fee for an original or a continuation statement shall
be $ .................
Renewal of filing is a familiar technic.' The remainder of these
subsections appears to require no comment.
Wash. 92, 59 P.2d 1120 (1936), a creditor whose claims antedated the mortgage and
who commenced his action and attached with knowledge of the mortgage, was denied
priority for the stated reason that he knew of the mortgage. Whether the creditor
was otherwise within the benefits of the statute is obscure, the opinion containing on
this point only the statement: "Conceding that (he) was a creditor within the con-
templation of (the statute), the requirement of that statute is ineffectual in this case
because (he) had actual notice. . . ." The Cardwell case is inconsistent with other
decisions in which a creditor's status under a filing statute is not governed by his
knowledge of the unfiled transaction, (see note 64 supra) and is particularly un-
fortunate in leaving an inference that a creditor who became such before the mortgage
was given would be advanced to priority by the failure to refile. In Strong v. Sunsel
Copper Co., 9 Wn.2d 213, 114 P.2d 526 (1941), the contesting creditors became such
more than two years after the maturity date of the mortgage; their claims were held
to be prior without discussion.
The Code solution, which treats the security interest as perfected until the filing
lapses and as unperfected thereafter, is certainly preferable to that achieved by the
Washington chattel mortgage filing statute and cases. The trust receipts and accounts
receivable statutes, RCW 61.20.120 (4) and RCW 63.16.060, protect transactions
entered into during the filing period even as against interests accruing in the property
thereafter. This is a more liberal treatment than is provided by the Code.
198 RCW 61.04.040 and 61.04.050 (chattel mortgages; renewal for a year by filing
an affidavit setting forth the amount due on the mortgage; the process can be repeatec
at year intervals) ; RCW 61.20.130 (5) (trust receipts; renewal by filing a neA
statement of financing, or an affidavit executed by the entruster; the process can x
repeated at year intervals) ; RCW 63.16.060 (accounts receivable; renewal by filing
a new notice of assignment or an affidavit of the assignee; can be repeated at interval,
of three years).
[AUG.
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Section 9-404. Statement of Termination of Financing.
(1) Whenever there is no outstanding secured obligation and no com-
mitment to make advances, incur obligations or otherwise give value, the
secured party must on written demand by the debtor send the debtor, a
signed statement to that effect. If the secured party fails to send such a
termination statement within ten days after proper demand therefor he
shall be liable to the debtor for $100, and in addition for any loss caused
to the debtor by such failure.
(2) On presentation to the filing officer of such a termination statement
he must note it in the index. Unless a statute on disposition of public
records provides otherwise, the filing officer shall remove the financing
statement from the files and return the termination statement and the
financing statement to the secured party.
(3) The fee for filing such a termination statement shall be $ .................
The general scheme of this section would represent no material
variation in the local practice."" The provision for return of the
termination statement and the financing statement to the secured party
is a new detail and one which fills a gap in the existing law; it ought
to be an effective counter to the risk of forgery of termination state-
ments.
Section 9-501. Index of Rights on Default; Procedure When Security
Agreement Covers Both Real and Personal Property.
(1) When a debtor is in default under the security agreement a secured
party may reduce his claim to judgment. If the collateral is accounts,
chattel paper, contract rights, or instruments, he may in addition proceed
under Section 9-504, or under Section 9-502 for a time and thereafter
under Section 9-504. If the collateral is documents, he may in addition
proceed under Section 9-504 either as to the documents or as to the
goods covered thereby. If the collateral is goods, he may in addition do
one or more of the following (except that he cannot accept the collateral
190 RCW 61.16.040 (as amended in 1953) and RCW 61.16.050 create a system for
the appropriate file-clearing action on satisfaction of a chattel mortgage or conditional
sale contract. Refusal of the security holder to supply the release subjects him to a
$25 penalty. Neither the Code nor these Washington statutes specifically answer the
questions which arise when the debtor makes tender of the debt or of the sum he
claims is due and the creditor refuses it, or where the statute of limitations has run
on the debt. The Code language, "No obligation" would appear to require a holding
that no termination statement is needed in these situations. Although the Washington
law is not entirely clear, Equitable Savings & Loan Association v. Barnes, 69 Wash.
1, 124 Pac. 118 (1912), a land mortgage case which would no doubt be followed in a
chattel situation, held that the mortgagor was entitled to a release upon tender of the
balance actually due, even though the mortgagee claimed a larger sum. The mort-
gagee's claim of more was probably not made in good faith. RCW 63.16.070 (accounts
receivable) calls for a cancellation of the filing statement, to be executed by the
assignee upon payment or satisfaction of the secured obligation. No penalty is speci-
fied. The trust receipt statute, RCW 61.20.010 et seq., contains no comparable pro-
visions.
19541
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in discharge of the obligation under Section 9-505 and also recover a
deficiency under Section 9-504):
(a) foreclose the security interest by any available judicial procedure;
(b) take possession of the collateral under Section 9-503;
(c) prepare or process the collateral for disposition as provided in
Section 9-504;
(d) sell and recover a deficiency as provided in Section 9-504;
(e) accept the collateral in discharge of the obligation as provided
in Section 9-505.
The system of remedies, set forth here and in the following sections,
would represent a major advance in Washington. The Code strives
for flexibility in procedures, encouragement of non-court realization,
and variations in the principles governing realization methods only
where the characteristics of different types of property justify them.
This is accomplished without the sacrifice of any significant debtor-
safeguards. The existing law is notable for varying degrees of rigidity
at the point of remedies, which are controlled by the type of security
transaction. The critical factor in any realization system is the availa-
bility of technics which derive from the collateral the greatest possible
amount of money for application on the debt and preservation of the
debtor's equity. On this score the local law, particularly as to chattel
mortgages and conditional sales, now fails miserably.
The chattel mortgagee must foreclose; he cannot obtain possession
by either self-help or judicial process, and cannot by use of a power
of sale clause avoid the burden of foreclosing."' The sale in foreclosure
is invariably a public auction conducted by the sheriff.20 ' This method
of liquidation is notoriously inefficient in many situations, e.g. where
the property is distress merchandise or the circumstances otherwise
require intensive selling efforts or sales through-out an extensive geo-
graphic area or on credit or in parcels or over an extended period of
time, if the maximum of return is to be had.
200 RCW 61.08.010 et seq. provides for foreclosure, either by action in the superior
court or by informal proceedings under which the sheriff sells without court action.
In Roche Fruit & Produce Co. v. Vaught, 143 Wash 601, 255 Pac. 953 (1927), the
court declined to enforce a mortgage clause conferring on the mortgagee a right to
possession on default. This case was followed in Carey v. Interstate Bond and Mort-
gage Co., 4 Wn.2d 632, 64 P.2d 579 (1940), in holding a mortgagee who took possession
by self-help to be a converter despite such a mortgage clause. Another step in a chain
of events which precludes use of the power of sale form of chattel mortgage realization
in Washington was taken in Parks v. Yakima Valley Production Cr. Ass'n., 194 Wash.
380, 78 P.2d 162 (1938). There a mortgagee in possession was held in conversion for
selling the goods, despite a power of sale clause. The opinion is not so phrased as to
clearly disclose the court's reasoning.
201 RCW 61.08.040 calls for sale in the mode specified for execution sales of like
property.
[AUG.
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The conditional sale vendor is obliged to choose between taking
the property or suing for the contract balance, 02 and having chosen
the property can forfeit the vendee's interest therein by retaining all
payments made."' Neither the forced election nor the forfeiture are
features of our law for which any valid justification can be made:
The pledgee, under the present law, can sell chattels at public sale
and collect choses.2° ' He can foreclose either type of property by
2 03 Standard Finance Company v. Townsend, 1 Wn.2d 274, 95 P.2d 786 (1939), and
Washington etc. Assn. v. Jacobs, 42 Wn.2d 460, 256 P2d 294 (1953), are illustrative.
These cases, and those therein cited, are also of some help in determining what conduct
will constitute the election. See too, on this point, Jones v. Reynolds, 45 Wash. 371,
88 Pac. 577 (1907) (which found no election; the vendor having refused to repossess,
the vendee abandoned the property and directed the vendor to take it, whereupon the
vendor took possession of and sold the property and sued for the balance of the price) ;
General Motors Truck Co. v. Pearson, 185 Wash. 446, 55 P.2d 616 (1936) (which
found no election; the vendee having been killed in an accident which badly damaged
the property, the vendor filed with the vendee's administrator a claim for the contract
balance; this was held not to preclude the vendor's right to insurance proceeds);
Eilers Music House v. Douglass, 90 Wash. 683, 156 Pac. 937 (1916) (suit for install-
ments of the price then accrued was held to be an election vesting title in the vendee
and precluding repossession upon subsequent defaults).
Whether repossession bars recovery on a check or note given for the down payment
has been a troublesome problem. In Norman v. Meeker, 91 Wash. 534, 158 Pac. 78
(1916), a negative answer was given by the court, the note being one on which the
maker was a third person; a contrary result was reached and recovery denied in
Jones-Short Motor Co. v. Bolin, 153 Wash. 198, 279 Pac. 395 (1929), noted 30 YA.LE
L.J. 124, the note being one on which the vendee was the maker.
That the theory underlying the vendor's remedies is obscure is evident upon com-
paring these election cases with the forfeiture cases cited in the following note, and
with the following cases which permit both repossession and recovery for the expenses
thereof, including attorney fees, and other items presumably requiring the continued
existence of the contract: Motor Contract Co. v. Van Der Volgen, 162 Wash. 449,
298 Pac. 705 (1931) (attorney fees); Union Machinery & Supply Co. v. McCush,
104 Wash. 62, 175 Pac. 559 (1918) (obligation of buyer to reimburse the vendor for
freight and insurance premiums). See also Bank of California v. Clear Lake Lbr. Co.,
146 Wash. 543, 264 Pac. 705 (1928).
203 See the discussion and citations in Jones-Short Motor Co. v. Bolin, 153 Wash.
198, 279 Pac. 395 (1929) ; Rider v. Cottle, 32 Wn.2d 538, 202 P.2d 741 (1949). The
only ameliorating principle is a highly informal sort of redemption right, which
appears without any extended explanation in Kohler & Chase v. Turner, 84 Wash. 192,
146 Pac. 393 (1915), and Standard Furniture House v. Burrows, 59 Wash. 455, 110
Pac. 13 (1910) ; in these cases the vendor sued in replevin on default of the vendee and
a judgment was entered under which the relief sought was given, conditioned on the
vendee's failure to pay the contract balance within a stated period.
It will be observed that there is a certain inconsistency in the reasoning of the court
in Eilers Music House v. Oriental Co., 69 Wash. 618, 125 Pac. 1023 (1912), cited in
the Jones-Short Motor Co. case for the proposition that the vendor can retain the
vendee's payments as liquidated damages. The vendor there sued in replevin, to regain
possession, which was a part of his performance under the contract. An action to
recover a performance previously rendered is an action in restitution, not an action to
enforce the contract.
See also the discussion in note 225 infra.
204 Nagel v. Ham, Yearsley & Ryrie, 88 Wash. 99, 152 Pac. 520 (1915) (states the
common law requirements of notice and public sale) ; Kolstad v. Younglove Grocery
Co., 32 Wn.2d 212, 201 P.2d 142 (dictum stating the common law rule regarding sale).
Each of these cases involved a pledge of stock.
There are several cases involving pledges of choses and illustrating the fact that
realization is in practice effected by collection: Scandinavian American Bank v. Apple-
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action.2"5 The pledge agreement can extend the pledgee's remedies to
include private sale, sale without notice to the pledgor, and a right in
the pledgee to buy at public sale."0 All sales must be fairly conducted
and the risk of controversy over this detail is greater where the sale is
private. Some lending institutions for this reason prefer not to proceed
by private sale even though their pledge-agreement forms provide for
the method.
ton, 62 Wash. 203, 115 Pac. 109 (1911) (issue was the pledgee's status as a holder in
due course) ; Lincoln County State Bank v. Martin, 112 Wash. 186, 191 Pac. 815 (1920)
(pledgee of notes secured by mortgage on land sued to foreclose the mortgage; defense
of prior payment denied); Davis & Co. v. Bedgisoff, 155 Wash. 127, 283 Pac. 665
(1930) (pledgee of note, although holder in due course, denied recovery for excess
above amount of the pledgor's debt, and having failed to put in evidence upon which
such excess could be found, recovered nothing) ; Freepons v. Elliott, 190 Wash. 348,
67 P.2d 924 (1937) (pledgee of note and mortgage, having foreclosed the mortgage
and acquired the sheriff's deed in that foreclosure, holds the title in the legal relation
of pledge).
There appears, bowever, to be no local case holding as a matter of law that the
pledgee must collect instead of sell, there being no authorization to sell contained in
the loan agreement. This common law principle would no doubt be followed should
the issue arise. See BRowN, PERsoA.L PROPERTY § 134 (1936).
205 Denny v. Cole, 22 Wash. 372, 61 Pac. 38 (1900) (holding receiver for pledgor
to be a necessary party) ; Fidelity Nat. Bank v. Fox, 144 Wash. 494, 258 Pac. 335
(1927) (holding that a deficiency judgment can be decreed) ; Ross v. Jones, 174 Wash.
205, 24 P.2d 622 (1933) .(holding that a jury is discretionary only) ; Kolstad v.
Younglove Grocery Co., 32 Wn.2d 212, 201 P.2d 142 (1948) (holding that the running
of the statute of limitations on the debt did not bar foreclosure) ; Carter v. Curlew
Creamery Co., 20 Wn.2d 275, 147 P.2d 276 (1944) (the main issue concerned the
position of a pledgor whose pledge was made to secure another's debt).
206 Although there are a number of Washington decisions in which a glimpse of a
contractual provision about reriedies can be had, issues about the validity of such a
provision have been infrequently raised. The cases inform us that pledge remedies can
be created bv contract, but do not spell out many of the refinements. Muhlenberg v.
Tacoma, 25 Wash. 36, 64 Pac. 925 (1901) (pledgee's sale to itself held invalid because
made with knowledge that the value of the collateral would be materially increased
should a favorable outcome be reached in a collateral lawsuit then pending; the opinion
has a good discussion of the burden on a pledgee who proceeds under a contract power
of sale clause) ; German-Am. etc. Bank v. Spokane etc. Nay. Co., 49 Wash. 359, 95
Pac. 261 (1908) (pledgee who sold at private sale held to have sold without the dili-
gence required, and obliged to answer for the "actual value" of the collateral) ; Broad-
way Bank of Kansas City v. Whittaker, 177 Wash. 62, 30 P.2d 993 (1934) (pledgee
who received a note as holder in due course and who later bought it in sale on default
of the pledgor, retained the status of holder in due course) ; Dodge v. Scripps, 179
Wash. 308, 37 P.2d 896 (1934) (contains at page 316 of the Washington report a
statement of the burden on a pledgee who proceeds under a power of sale) ; Chambers
v. Carlyon, 188 Wash. 352, 62 P.2d 726 (1936) (although vague, the opinion seems to
rest on a finding that the sale was properly made according to the terms of an agree-
ment about the mode of sale) ; Sherman v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 53 Wash. 523, 102
Pac. 419 (1909) (pledge of life insurance policy to the insurer; court approved can-
cellation of the policy and extinguishment of the debt by book entry on default by the
pledgor; the case is apparently the only local holding on the book-entry problem; the
opinion also contains this passage: "It is competent for the parties to the contract to
stipulate that the pledgee may buy the securities at private sale at the market price, in
case of default in payment of the debt, or that he may sell at public or private sale
with or without notice, and that he may become the purchaser.") Whether the
Washington court would sustain such an arrangement where the pledgee is not a life
insurance company whose collateral is its own policy (for example a pledgee bank
whose collateral is one of its own savings accounts) is not clear.
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The trust receipts act permits the entruster to assume possession
and to proceed by public or private sale. 0
An attempt by a mortgagee or pledgee or entruster to draft himself
into a right to forfeit the collateral on default will likely fail. s0 Agree-
ments made after default, for transfer of the debtor's interest to the
security holder in lieu of realization, can be operative; they will be
closely scrutinized for evidence of oppression and will probably fail
if the debtor's interest is unfairly valued."s
207 RCW 6120.060 is the Washington enactment of Sec. 6, the remedies section of
the Uniform Trust Receipts Act.
208 RCW 61.20.050 (trust receipts) expressly forbids such an agreement save in
the limited situation specified in subsection (5) of that section.
Although the Washington cases in which it was asserted that an equity of redemption
was clogged have involved land transactions, no different principles are applicable in
chattel transactions. The issues typically are factual, the crucial inquiry being whether
the parties were debtor and creditor. Hoover v. Bouffieur, 74 Wash. 382, 133 Pac. 602
(1913) (deed and option to repurchase were found to be a mortgage rather than a
sale) ; Beverly v. Davis, 79 Wash. 537, 140 Pac. 696 (1914 (deed and. option to re-
purchase were found to be a mortgage rather than a sale; the court particularly
emphasized the fact that a promise to pay can be implied in a transaction which care-
fully omits any express promise to do so) ; Phillips v. Blaser, 13 Wn2d 439, 125 P.2d
291 (1942) (deed and contract to reconvey found to be a mortgage; the evidentiary
significance of wide disparity between the sum which passed to the grantor and the
worth of the property was particularly stressed); Plummer v. Ilse, 41 Wash. 5, 82
Pac. 1009 (1905) (a classic example of clogging; when the loan was made a mortgage
was given to secure it and at the same time the mortgagor executed a deed absolute
to the lender, the deed being placed in escrow with instructions for delivery to the
lender should the mortgage debt be defaulted; default did occur and the deed was
duly delivered; the court held it to be a mortgage) ; Allen v. Graaf, 179 Wash. 431,
38 P2d 236 (1934) (a deed and contract to reconvey were found to be just that,
against the contention that a loan and mortgage transaction existed); O'Reilly v.
Tillman, 111 Wash. 594, 191 Pac. 866 (1920) (on very close facts the court held the
transaction to be no mortgage because no debt ever came into existence).
There is no definitive local pledge case. A statement of the general pledge rule
appears as a dictum in Sherman v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 53 Wash. 523, 102 Pac. 419(1909).
209 A conveyance given by the defaulting mortgagor in lieu of foreclosure has
come to litigation in Washington only in the context of land mortgages; the pledge
or chattel mortgage presents no different problems. If the lender at the same time
executes an option to or a repurchase contract with the debtor, arguably the debt
continues and the new transaction is but a continuation of the mortgage. See Swarm
v. Boggs, 12 Wash. 246, 40 Pac. 941 (1895) ; Hesser v. Brown, 40 Wash. 688, 82 Pac.
934 (1905) ; Neeson v. Smith, 47 Wash. 386, 92 Pac. 131 (1907) ; Johnson v. National
Bank of Commerce, 65 Wash. 261, 118 Pac. 21 (1911); Pittwood v. Spokane Savings
& Loan Society, 141 Wash. 229, 251 Pac. 283 (1926) ; Clancy v. Tremblay, 155 Wash.
558, 285 Pac. 453 (1930). It so happens that the deed was found in each of these
cases to have replaced the mortgage. The recurrence of litigation of this type dem-
onstrates how strong the temptation may be for the former debtor to assert the transfer
to be a mortgage, and the extreme importance to the transferee of the necessary
rebuttal evidence.
The position of the transferee in lieu of foreclosure as against subordinate interests
in the property can be a troublesome question. See Maim v. Griffith, 109 Wash. 30,
186 Pac. 647 (1919) (holding the transferee not to be a bona fide purchaser) ; Beecher
v. Thompson, 120 Wash. 520, 207 Pac. 1056 (1922) (merger was denied and the
mortgage held to continue, as against a subordinate interest) ; Gill v. Strouf, 5 Wn.2d
426, 105 P2d 829 (1940) (good discussion of the merger problem). As the debtor's
successor the transferee takes subject to junior liens, hence the importance of avoiding
19541
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Although the pledge and trust receipt rate better in these particulars
than does the chattel mortgage or conditional sale contract, it cannot
be accurately said of any type of security that the legal machinery
now available in Washington will, in all situations, permit use of the
precise realization technic best calculated to sacrifice the least possible
part of the debtor's equity, and correlatively to produce the maximum
of return for application on the debt. The Code comes much nearer
to accomplishing just such an ideal system.
The first sentence of the subsection is followed by sentences in
which the phrase "may in addition" is used. This should not be con-
strued to mean that the secured party must always reduce his claim
to judgment. The purpose of this initial sentence is rather to state an
alternative method of procedure, which may be followed without
prejudice to the pursuit of other methods. It would represent no change
in existing law, save for the conditional sale contract.21 Pledgees or
mortgagees can sue on the debt without prejudicing their right to
realize on the collateral, and can assert a cause of action for the balance
which remains due on the debt after applying the proceeds of the
collateral." 1
merger. In Summy v. Ramsey, 53 Wash. 93, 101 Pac. 93 (1909), the fundamental
matter of the transferee's title was in issue; he was held to have the fee by virtue of
merger, after which the mortgage ceased to exist.
The trust receipts act reads in part: "Surrender of the trustee's interest to the
entruster shall be valid, on any terms upon which the trustee and the entruster may,
after default, agree." RCW 61.20.060 (4). Whether such surrender would transfer the
debtor's interest free of junior liens is not clear.
210 Cases illustrating the election rule are cited in note 202 srupra.
211 RCW 61.08.110 and 61.12.080, as construed, so provide for chattel mortgages.
Separate and concurrent actions, one on the debt and one to foreclose, are prohibited
by RCW 61.12.120. Foreclosure by action is uncommon, the notice and sale procedure
permitted by RCW 61.08.110 et seq. normally being employed. The significant chattel
mortgage cases are: Lassen v. Curtis, 40 Wn.2d 82, 241 P.2d 210 (1952) (holding
that a personal judgment entered in a combined action will support a levy on other
property after sale of the mortgaged chattels and application of the proceeds on thejudgment, even though the decree makes no express reference to or provision for a
"deficiency judgment") ; Codd v. Van Der Ahe, 92 Wash. 529, 159 Pac. 686 (1916)
(reaching a similar result) ; Quincy Valley State Bk. v. Schneider, 36 Wn.2d 748,
219 P.2d 985 (1950) (holding that an action may be brought on the note, after fore-
closure by notice and sale proceedings failed to realize enough to satisfy the obligation;
the court unfortunately rested its opinion on the presence in the mortgage of a covenant
to pay a deficiency, saying: "The issue presented is whether or not foreclosure of a
mortgage by notice and sale precludes a subsequent superior court action to recover a
deficiency. Whether it should do so in the ordinary case is a matter which we need
not decide, however, in view of the terms of the mortgage-"; a decision on the
broader ground would have set the problem at rest, while this rationale merely makes
another lawsuit probable; there would appear to be no valid basis upon which notice
and sale proceedings can be deemed to bar a later action on the note).
There are also several land mortgage cases which state similar principles: Seattle
Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Gwinn, Inc., 171 Wash. 695, 19 P.2d 111 (1933), in which
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The provision for foreclosure by "any available judicial procedure,"
where the collateral is goods, raises an obvious question. What judicial
procedures would be available? Courts of equity have inherent power
to entertain actions for the foreclosure of security interests. Although
the exercise of that power has typically been in terms of "mortgage"
or "pledge" or "conditional sale contract," the jurisdiction is certainly
flexible enough to pick up the security interest created by the Code.2"
(2) After default a secured party in possession has the rights and duties
provided in Section 9-207 and a debtor has
(a) a right of redemption as provided in Section 9-506; and
(b) a right as provided in Section 9-507 to require that the secured
party realize on his collateral in accordance with this Article.
This subsection states obviously desirable and expectable proposi-
tions to govern the legal situation while the secured party holds the
collateral after default and pending realization.
(3) The enumeration of rights in subsections (1) and (2) does not pur-
port to be exhaustive. The rules stated in this Part which give rights to
the court said: "In cases of notes and mortgages, the notes represent the debts, the
mortgage security for the payment of the debts. Either may be the basis of an action,
Frye v. Meyer, 22 Wash. 277, 60 Pac. 655 (1900) ; and, while Rem. Rev. Stat. § 1125,
provides against the maintenance of concurrent actions, we have held that a judgment
on notes secured by a mortgage would not constitute such a judgment res judicata in
a subsequent action for the foreclosure of the mortgage lien, for the purpose of recover-
ing that portion of the debt which remained unpaid under the personal judgment,
Citizens National Bank v. Abott, 72 Wash. 73, 129 Pac. 1085 (1913); thus showing
the separate character of each obligation with respect to its being the basis of a cause
of action"; Vanasse v. Cavey, 167 Wash. 238, 9 P2d 60 (1932), in which the court
said that the maker of a note secured by a mortgage is "liable upon the note, irrespec-
tive of the mortgaged property, and for any deficiency' remaining unpaid after the
application to the judgment of the proceeds of the sale thereof"; Federal Land Bank
of Spokane v. Miller, 155 Wash. 479, 284 Pac. 751 (1930), in which the court said of
one who assumies a mortgage debt: 'L--whether such an obligation shall be enforced
by a suit in equity seeking foreclosure of the mortgage and in the same suit a deficiency
personal judgment against those liable upon such a covenant, or shall be enforced by an
action at law seeking only a personal money judgment against those liable upon such
a covenant, is a matter of free choice on the part of those entitled to the benefit of
such a covenant"; Hanna v. Kasson, 26 Wash. 568, 67 Pac. 271 (1901) (holding that
an action to judgment on the note does not bar a subsequent action to foreclose the
mortgage; land was involved). There is in Citizens Nat. Bank v. Abbott, 72 Wash. 73,
129 Pac. 1085 (1913), a dictum in accord with Hanna v. Kasson.
That a pledgee can go against either property or debt without prejudice to his right
against the collateral should the judgment be unpaid, or his right to a judgment for
the balance should sale of the collateral yield insufficient to discharge the debt, is well
settled. See BRowN, PERSONAL PROPERTY, § 131 (1936). There appears to be no local
authority directly in point, and no reason to expect any departures in Washington.
The trust receipts act is not specific on this detail; it is generally assumed that the
entruster may pursue debt or collateral without losing his right to later take the
other course.
212 RCW 61.08.010 et seq.; 61.12.010 et seq., the statutes regulating foreclosure of
chattel mortgages, should be repealed if the Code is enacted.
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the debtor and impose duties on the secured party may be waived or
varied only as provided in this Part.
The first sentence of this subsection seems to contemplate both the
possibility of further legal development in the area of remedies, and
the possibility that peculiar problems may arise which require special
solution by agreement. The remainder of the subsection sets a limit
on the power of the parties to bargain about remedies.
(4) If the security agreement covers both real and personal property,
the secured party may proceed under this Part as to the personal property
or he may proceed under the law relating to foreclosure of real estate
mortgages as to both the real and the personal property. If the secured
party proceeds under the real estate mortgage law, the provisions of this
Part do not apply.
The idea that a mortgage on land and chattels can be foreclosed in
one action is not new; this has long been the local practice although
no express statutory authorization exists. If the Code is adopted, it
would be desirable to supplement the land mortgage foreclosure
statutes with a section specifically authorizing the combined action.
Section 9-502.--Rights of Assignee When Assignor Defaults.
(1) When so agreed and in any event on default the secured party is
entitled to notify an account debtor or the obligors on an instrument to
make payment to him whether or not the assignor was theretofore making
collections on the collateral, and also to take control of any proceeds to
which he is entitled under Section 9-306.
(2) When the secured party is by agreement entitled to charge back
uncollected instruments, accounts, chattel paper or contract rights or is
otherwise entitled to full or limited recourse against the debtor, a secured
party who takes control of collections must proceed in a commercially
reasonable manner to realize upon the collateral and may deduct his
reasonable expenses of realization from the collections. If so agreed, the
debtor is entitled to any surplus in the net amount realized, or is liable
for any deficiency, or both; if the agreement is silent and if the transaction
between the debtor and the secured party is in fact a sale, the debtor is
not entitled to any surplus and is not liable for any deficiency, but if it is
in fact a loan he is entitled to any surplus and is liable for any deficiency.
This section states propositions which would at present, in a wel
drafted loan or sale agreement, be covered expressly. The end resul
would not, were the Code enacted, vary materially from that accom
plished under current practices. Where accounts are pledged on
non-notification basis, the lender will now typically reserve the righ
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to notify and take over collection on default, or even at will. Although
the multiplicity of guaranty or buy-back or reserve-fund variations
of the sale of accounts transaction makes sweeping generalizations
unwise, if the sale is made on a basis of collection by the seller the
parties will certainly have an understanding about termination of the
arrangement and the taking over of collection by the buyer. In either
sale or pledge, the buyer or lender will be held to some standard of
diligence in collecting. The Code, wiih its provision for "a commer-
cially reasonable" standard, may not add much certainty but does at
least provide a formula where one does not now exist. It should be
noted here that Section 9-504, permitting the sale of collateral, applies
to accounts. A question pertinent to that section and this one as well,
in instances of sales of accounts, is the conduct which will amount to
"default." It may be surmised that the answer will lie in the financing
agreement; failure to collect with due diligence, or to replace past-due
accounts with current ones, or to buy back stale accounts, may well
be breaches of a covenant made by the seller. In fact it would appear
highly important to back the sale by an explicit agreement concerning
such details.
Section 9-503. Secured Party's Right to Take Possession After Default.
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take
possession of the collateraL In taking possession a secured party may pro-
ceed without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the
peace. If the security agreement so provides the secured party may re-
quire the debtor to assemble the collateral and make it available to the
secured party at a place reasonably convenient to both parties. Without
removal a secured party may render equipment unuseable, and may dis-
pose of collateral on the debtor's premises under Section 9-504. A debtor
may request the secured party to remove collateral from the debtor's
premises after a reasonable time for its disposition has passed. If the
secured party fails to remove the collateral within a reasonable time after
the receipt of such a request, the debtor may remove and store it.
The statutory creation of a right to possession on default would
change the existing law in some particulars l The types of secured
creditor who now have a right to take possession on default, the con-
ditional sale vendor and trust receipt entruster, can do so by self-help.
The limitation expressed in the Code phrase, "without breach of the
21 s The conditional sale vendor has this right. See note 202 mtpra and Gaffney v.
O'Leary, 155 Wash. 171, 283 Pac. 1091 (1929). So does the trust receipt entruster.
RCW 61.20.060 (1). The chattel mortgage does not. See note 200 supra.
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peace," is likewise in the Uniform Trust Receipts Act; in conditional
sale cases our court has reached somewhat the same position.2"'
The remainder of the section deals with details on which there is no
definitive present authority; the Code solutions appear to be sound.
Section 9-504. Secured Party's Right to Dispose of Collateral After De-
fault; Effect of Disposition.
(1) A secured party after default may sell, lease or otherwise dispose of
any or all of the collateral in its then condition or following any com-
mercially reasonable preparation or processing. Any sale of goods is
subject to the Article on Sales (Article 2). The proceeds of disposition
shall be applied in the order following to
(a) the reasonable expenses of retaking, holding, preparing for sale,
selling and the like to the extent the recovery thereof is not pro-
hibited by law or agreement;
(b) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by the security interest
under which the disposition is made;
(c) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by any subordinate se-
curity interest in the collateral if written notification of demand
therefor is received before distribution of the proceeds is com-
pleted.
If the security agreement secures an indebtedness, the secured party
must account to the debtor for any surplus and, unless otherwise agreed,
the debtor is liable for any deficiency. But if the underlying transaction
was a sale of instruments, accounts, contract rights, or chattel paper, the
debtor is entitled to any surplus or is liable for any deficiency only if the
security agreement so provides.
Insofar as this subsection authorizes the sale of choses in action, it
probably departs from the existing law.15
It seems fairly obvious that Section 9-504 would quickly become,
were the Code enacted, the main reliance of lenders obliged to realize
on their collateral. The section applies to all manner of collateral and
is in effect a detailed and comprehensive power-of-sale statute. It
214 RCW 61.20.060 (2) is the trust receipts act provision. The conditional sale
cases are: Burgin v. Universal Credit Co., 2 Wn.2d 364, 98 P.2d 291 (1940) (holding
the vendor liable for injury inflicted on the vendee in the repossession process; the
opinion contains this thought-provoking passage: "The respondent [vendee] had a
right to obstruct the attempt of the appellants [finance company assignee of the original
vendor] to forcibly repossess his car by all lawful and reasonable means.") ; Roberts
v. Speck, 169 Wash. 613, 14 P.2d 33 (1932) (vendor held liable for an assault and
battery inflicted on a vendee in the process of repossessing).
215 See note 204 supra. The pledgee can of course get the same end result by fore-
closure, in which a decree ordering sale of the collateral can be had, or by an appro-
priate pledge agreement recital. See note 205 supra.
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would be most beneficial in those numerous situations in which the
sheriff's sale works badly.
The first sentence of subsection (1) states a broad power of dis-
position in terms of method, as well as a power to put the collateral
in disposable condition. This is supplemented in the following sub-
section. Part (a) clarifies details on which the present law is obscure,
save for the trust receipts statute; 216 the expenses mentioned are those
which a well-drafted mortgage or pledge document would now permit
to be deducted from sale proceeds. Part (b) implements the general
idea that liquidation rather than forfeiture is the Code procedure.
This is supplemented by the concluding two sentences of the sub-
section, which state a necessary qualification for financing sales of
choses, and provide for a deficiency where a loan was involved. Part
(c) provides a sensible and desirable technic for a problem which is
routine at present in sales under powers.
(2) Disposition of the collateral may be at public or private proceedings
and may be made by way of one or more contracts. Sale or other disposi-
tion may be as a unit or in parcels and at any time and place and on any
terms but every aspect of the disposition including the method, manner,
time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable. Unless collateral
is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a type
customarily sold on a recognized market the secured party must give to
the debtor, and to any other secured party who has a security interest in
the collateral to be disposed of and who has filed a financing statement
or is known to the secured party making the disposition, reasonable
notification of the time and place of any public or private sale and appro-
priate notification of any other intended disposition. Notification may
be sent to addresses given in a financing statement if the secured party
has no knowledge of different addresses. The secured party may buy at
any public sale and if the collateral is of a type customarily sold in a
recognized market or is of a type which is the subject of widely dis-
tributed standard price quotations he may buy at private sale.
The importance of the first two sentences of this subsection can
hardly be over-stated. Nothing comparable to the range of sales-
methods here made available now exists in Washington for any type
of security. The Code even goes beyond the Uniform Trust Receipts
Act,217 which reached the previous high in common-sense remedies
216 RCW 61.20.060 (3b) is the Washington enactment of Sec. 6 (3b) Uniform
Trust Receipts Act, which the Code closely follows on this detail.
217 See RCW 61.20.060 (3b).
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legislation, while the contrast with the position of a chattel mortgagee
is a startling one. 18
It is of course true that many a transaction would be closed out
under the Code without resort to the power to complete or process
before sale or to sell in lots or in different geographic localities or for
credit either open or secured. The point is that there are also many
transactions which cannot be closed out by a sale in gross, as is, in
the county where the property is, and for cash, without sacrificing a
substantial part of the real value. The mortgagee who would avoid
such a sacrifice must now resort to persuasion and agreement, a tactic
often made inexpedient by the existence of attachments and other
complicating factors. The pledgee is likewise unduly circumscribed
unless he has a comprehensive pledge agreement." 9
So broad a power of sale must contemplate fair dealing by the
security-holder. We are accustomed to close judicial supervision of
the element of fairness in sales under powers; whether the standard
with which these two sentences conclude will work out to a materially
different end result can be determined only by experience. As "com-
mercial reasonableness" takes on a specific content in use, it may well
be that the security holder will be more certain concerning the burden
which rests on him than is the mortgagee or pledgee under the existing
law. Section 9-507 (2) provides guides which should make it possible
to predict the commercial reasonableness of most proposed realization-
sales with a good deal of assurance. Trade usage, which will both
exist and be readily ascertainable in ordinary commercial financing
situations, should prove to be a particularly helpful source of light
concerning "commercial reasonableness."
The remainder of the subsection regulates details in ways which
should occasion no difficulty. The notice requirement and the limita-
tion on purchase by the secured party cannot be avoided by security-
agreement drafting.10 a
(3) When collateral is disposed of by a secured party after default, the
disposition transfers to a purchaser for value all rights of the debtor,
discharges the security interest under which it is made and any security
interest or lien subordinate thereto, and the purchaser takes free of aU
such rights and interests even though the secured party fails to comply
with the requirements of this Part or of any judicial proceedings
218 See note 200 supra.
219 See note 206 supra.
19Ma See Sec. 9-501 (3), discussed supra.
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* (a) in the case of a judicial sale if the purchaser has no knowledge
of any defects in the sale and if he does not buy in collusion with
the secured party or other bidders; or
(b) in any other case if the purchasera cts in good faith.
The statement here of the interest which passes under a rightful
disposition, whether in foreclosure or in out-of-court proceedings,
represents no thange. ° Parts (a) and (b) extend, with refinements,
an idea first advanced in the trust receipts statutePoL and probably
not now the law as to other types of transaction.s The slight variation
in the purchaser's position, depending on whether the sale is in fore-
closure or otherwise, is new. The protection here accorded one who
buys from the secured party ought to have a beneficial effect on the
whole realization procedure, since it insulates the buyer from the
treacherous fact issues about default, and about procedural regularity,
which may govern the rightfulness of the sale. The Code solution
would benefit all debtors in leaving for settlement between the original
parties, the secured party and the debtor, the infrequent instances
of real controversy about the rightfulness of the sale.
It will be observed that Section 9-504 does not undertake to specify
the period within which disposition shall be made by the secured
party. The Comment informs us that the requirement of subsection
(2), expressed in the phrase "commercially reasonable," will govern
this detail. While concededly imprecise, so flexible a formula should
enable the secured party to safely delay where delay fairly looks to
more favorable market. The following section states a qualification.
Section 9-505. Compulsory Disposition of Collateral; Acceptance of
the Collateral as Discharge of Obligation.
(1) In the case of a purchase money security interest in consumer goods
=0 The effect of subsection (3) is to vest in the buyer such interest as the debtor
had when the security transaction occurred. This is the consequence both of sale in
foreclosure, and of sale under a power of sale, which includes all out-of-court sales
by pledgees.
2201LRCW 6120.060 (3c) is the Washington enactment of Sec. 6 (3c), Uniform
Trust Receipts Act, which reads: "A purchaser in good faith and for value from an
entruster in possession takes free of the trustees interest, even in a case in which the
entruster is liable to the trustee for conversion."
n A1 pledgee who sells wrongfully, e.g. in an unauthorized way, or when the pledgor
is not in default, is a converter and his transferee gets no title. An innocent transferee
will, however, acquire the pledgee's interest and be entitled to hold possession pending
receipt of payment of the debt balance. See BROWN, P& SONAL PROPERTY § 136 (1936)
at page 623. There appears to be no local decisioft on this problem.
A chattel mortgagee who forecloses wrongfully, having no right to the remedy, or
without conformity to essential procedural details, transfers only such interest as he
has. JONES, CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND CONDIIONAL. SALES § 811 (Bowers ed. 1933).
There appears to be no local decision on this problem.
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if the debtor has paid sixty per cent of the cash price and has not signed
after default a statement renouncing his rights a secured party who has
taken possession of collateral must dispose of it under Section 9-504 and
if he fails to do so within ninety days after he takes possession the debtor
at his option may recover in conversion or under Section 9-507(1) on
secured party's liability.
This subsection qualifies the preceding section, in that an arbitrary
time limit on sale is fixed for the limited area covered here. It also
limits subsection (2) of this section.
(2) In any other case a secured party in possession may, after default,
propose to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the obligation. Written
notice of such proposal shall be given to the debtor and to any other
secured party who has a security interest in the collateral and who has
filed a financing statement or is known to the secured party in possession.
If the debtor or other person entitled to receive notification objects within
thirty days from receipt of the notification the secured party must dispose
of the collateral under Section 9-504, but in the absence of such objec-
tion within said thirty days the secured party may hold the collateral or
dispose of it free from the requirements of this Article.
This subsection sets up an alternative realization procedure which
is now unknown 2 The details, and particularly the limitations on
the secured party's power to acquire the property in lieu of other
realization steps, are clear enough.
Section 9-506. Debtor's Right to Reclaim Collateral.
At any time before the secured party has disposed of collateral or en-
tered into a contract for its disposition under Section 9-504 or before
the obligation has been discharged under Section 9-505(2) the debtor
may reclaim the collateral by tendering payment of all sums due under
the defaulted agreement as well as the expenses reasonably incurred by
the secured party in retaking, holding and preparing for disposition.
The gist of this section, which both permits redemption until sucb
time as the secured party has undertaken realization and prohibits
redemption thereafter, coincides with the existing Washington chattel
22 The nearest analogy is found in a few pledge cases sustaining realization b3
book entry. See Sherman v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 53 Wash. 523, 102 Pac. 419 (1909)
discussed in note 206 supra.
The mortgage cases on clogging the equity of redemption are indicated at note 20E
supra. Like results would no doubt be reached in a pledge case. The Code permits
very limited invasion of the basic idea of the clogging cases, which guard the mort.
gagor against forfeiture by flatly prohibiting the security holder from taking th
property in lieu of foreclosure or sale, save upon an agreement reached after thi
mortgage was executed.
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mortgage law,2 ' and departs a little from the conditional sale cases. 2'
Although the language "reclaim by tendering" as used by the Code
is novel, there is ample precedent for the idea that a security interest
is destroyed by a legally effective tender. The Comment stresses a
222 The chattel mortgagor can redeem any time before sale in foreclosure. See
Thomas v. Seattle Brewing & Malting Co., 48 Wash. 560, 94 Pac. 11 (1908). This
is not a redemption case. The suit was in claim and delivery, against the sheriff
and mortgagee, following a tender by the mortgagor's transferee. As a practical
matter, a redemption action is unlikely save by a person who wants to take the mort-
gagee's position by subrogation and is accordingly unable to make a legally operative
tender because he insists on making an assignment of the mortgage a condition to his
alleged tender. If one who owes the debt, and who has no right over against anyone,
is concerned, he can make an effective tender (save where the amount due is uncertain)
and will usually do so; the effectiveness of the tender will often be litigated in an action
to clear title or force the execution of a release, rather than in a redemption action.
But, since a tender cannot be effectively made save during such period as the right
to redeem exists, cases like the Thomas case demonstrate the existence of a right to
redeem when the tender was made. The apparent inference in Murray v. O'Brien,
56 Wash. 361, 105 Pac. 84 (1909), that the right to redeem ends when the foreclosure
action is initiated must be examined in its context; the court was concerned with the
mechanics of tender, not the terminal date past which no sort of tender would be
effective in aid of redemption. The case does not conflict with the Thomas holding.
The opinion in the Thomas case contains a dictum stating that the common law rule
was the same for pledges. The statement is accurate. See BROWN, PERSONAL. PROPERTY§ 135 (1936), page 608.
The specification in the trust receipts statute, that the entruster shall hold, upon
repossession, with the rights and duties of a pledgee, would appear to require appli-
cation of the pledge rule about redemption. See RCW 61.20.060 (3a).
27 The final cut-off point, for the conditional sale vendee, seems to be determined
by the judgment in the vendor's action to replevin the chattel, where such action is
brought. See the cases cited in note 203 supra. If the vendor repossessed by self-help,
the vendee would not be aided by those cases, and would presumably be without remedy.
That default is not itself a cut-off point is evidenced by the tender cases, cited in the
following note.
=5 Tender of the sum due by one who owes the debt will divest the mortgagee of
his interest; apparently the time within which a tender can be made is governed by
the terminal date past which redemption would not be possible. There are several
significant Washington cases. Thomas v. Seattle Brewing & Malting Co., 48 Wash.
560, 94 Pac. 116 (1908) (tender by the mortgagor's transferee, made on the day set
for sale under notice and sale proceedings, and prior to such sale, divested the mort-
gagee of his lien and sustained an action against sheriff and mortgagee in claim and
delivery; the opinion does not state whether the transferee assumed the debt; the court
said that the tender need not be kept good); Murray v. O'Brien, 56 Wash. 361, 105
Pac. 840 (1909) (a somewhat confused opinion concerning a land mortgage, suggest-
ing that a tender can be effectively made during the pendency of an action to foreclose
only by a tender into court or otherwise kept good; redemption rather than discharge
of the mortgage lien was involved, and the discussion of tender must be evaluated in
light of that fact) ; Tucker v. Lowelthal, 118 Wash. 638, 204 Pac. 773 (1922) (fore-
closure denied on showing of effective tender made before action commenced) ; Easton
v. Littooy, 91 Wash. 648, 158 Pac. 531 (1916) (in an action to foreclose, a defense of
prior tender was denied on a finding that the sum due was in honest dispute and that
the sum tendered was less than the mortgagee claimed was due; the court also in-
ferred that a tender by one who took subject to the debt but did not assume it would
not discharge the lien) ; Hilmes v. Moon, 168 Wash. 222, 11 P.2d 253 (1932) (land
mortgage; in foreclosure one defendant alleged prior tender and sought a ruling that
the mortgage lien was thereby discharged; the court held that under the circumstances
it was not error to deny a decree declaring the property to be free of the mortgage;
although the opinion is not clear the problem seems really to have been whether the
defendant could have his title cleared without renewing the tender; on this issue the
expectable outcome is that the mortgagor gets no equitable relief without paying the
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significant detail, i.e. that the "sums due" will typically be governed
by the existence and operation of an acceleration clause; after accelera-
tion the entire debt is due.22 6
Section 9-507. Secured Party's Liability for Failure to Comply With
This Part.
(1) If it is established that the secured party is not proceeding in
accordance with the provisions of this Part disposition may be ordered
or restrained on appropriate terms and conditions. If the disposition has
occurred the debtor or any person entitled to notification has a right to
recover from the secured party any loss caused by a failure to comply
with the provisions of this Part. If the collateral is consumer goods the
debtor has a right to recover in any event an amount not less than the
credit service charge or time price differential plus 10 per cent of the
cash price or principal amount of the debt.
The first sentence of this subsection evidently aims to state the
jurisdiction of a proper court to prevent wrongful and require rightful
disposition and is no departure from the current practice. Supervision
over mortgage foreclosure and sales under powers (in both mortgages
principl saum plus interest to the date of the tender) ; see GLENN, MORTGAGES § 53.1(1943).
There is an analgous problem in conditional sale transactions. Several local cases
are in point. National Cash Register Co. v. Wapples, 52 Wash. 657, 101 Pac. 227(1909) (holding that the vendee's assignee could defeat the vendor's action in replevin
by tendering into court the amount due) ; Vergonis v. Vaselou, 105 Wash. 441, 178
Pac. 463 (1919) (tender made out of court after replevin suit brought does not give
the vendee a defense; the opinion also suggests that a mere allegation in the vendee's
answer, of willingness to pay, would not suffice, this being a legal rather than an
equitable proceeding); Union Machinery & Supply Co. v. Thompson, 107 Wash. 630,
182 Pac. 573 (1919) (holding that a tender made by the vendee whose payments were
past due, and upon receipt of a notice threatening to serve notice of default and take
steps to gain possession of the property, was no defence to a replevin action because not
kept good and brought into court; the holding seems clearly wrong, since the tender
was made before forfeiture and should have been held to vest title in the vendee).
The theory upon which a vendee can effectively tender, even into court, after the
vendor has declared a forfeiture and demanded possssion, is most obscure. The
vendor's election is made by the declaration, at which time title vests in him and the
vendee's interest ceases. At least such would appear to be the right analysis and theory.
If it is, the vendee's power to defeat the replevin action is the product of the court's
creation of something akin to the mortgagor's redemption interest. This being so,
tender ought to be treated as necessary only in support of an equitable plea, and
subject to the usual equity propositions about tender. See also discussion in note 203
supra.
2 There are several Washington cases illustrating the principle that tender after
default but before the obligee has exercised a right to accelerate will preclude accelera-
tion. Weinberg v. Naher, 51 Wash. 591, 99 Pac. 736 (1909); Gunby v. Ingram, 57
Wash. 97, 106 Pac. 495 (1910). Payment will of course have a like effect. Heckert v
Hilscher, 61 Wash. 269, 112 Pac. 365 (1910) ; Schultz v. Wells Butchers' Supply Co.,
151 Wash. 382, 275 Pac. 737 (1929). So will conduct of the mortgagee which pre-
vented performance by the mortgagor. Tibbetts v. Bush & Lane Piano Co., 111 Wash.
165, 189 Pac. 996 (1920). There seems to be no doubt but what the tender or paymeni
must come before the obligee has exercised his power to accelerate, to have such effect
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and pledges) is a well enough settled area of equitable jurisdiction.
It would appear from the Comment that either the debtor, or other
creditors, may seek the relief provided here.
The reference in the second sentence, to "any person entitled to
notification," apparently goes back to Section 9-504 (2) and its re-
quirement of notice to the debtor and to other secured parties who
have filed or are known to the secured party undertaking the disposi-
tion. So read, this provision creates a statutory liability to the debtor
or subordinate secured parties, in the event of wrongful disposition.
The thought that wrongful disposition should subject a security holder
to liability is familiar enough. Wrongful seizure or foreclosure by a
mortgagee is a conversion as to the debtor.227 So is wrongful repos-
session by a conditional sale vendor 2 8 or wrongful sale by a pledgee.22'
The present position of junior security interests is however not clearly
delineated insofar as damages (as opposed to property actions), are
concerned. The Code may have created, at this point, a new principle.
In view of the great flexibility in the remedies provided, and of the
evident risks to junior security interests in the out-of-court disposition
which the Code makes available, this extension of liability would
appear to be quite appropriate.
The third sentence of this subsection states an entirely new propo-
sition. Whether an arbitrary minimum recovery can be justified, even
in the instance of consumer goods, is certainly debateable.
(2) The fact that a better price could have been obtained by a sale at a
different time or in a different method from that selected by the secured
party is not of itself sufficient to establish that the sale was not made in a
commercially reasonable manner. If the secured party either sells the
collateral in the usual manner in any recognized market therefor or if he
sells at the price current in such market at the time of his sale or if he has
otherwise sold in conformity with reasonable commercial practices among
dealers in the type of property sold he has sold in a commercially reason-
able manner. The principles stated in the two preceding sentences with
respect to sales also apply as may be appropriate to other types of disposi-
tion. The term "commercially reasonable" includes, among other things,
obtaining approval of the secured party's plan of disposition in a judicial
27 See note 200 supra; and Anstine v. McWiUiams, 24 Wn2d 230, 163 P.2d 816
(1945).
228 See Rihrdson v. Great Western Motors, 109 Wash. 324, 187 Pac. 333 (1920);
Long v. The Five-Hundred Co., 123 Wash. 347, 212 Pac. 559 (1923).
.
2
,See German-Am. etc. Bank v. Spokane etc. Nay. Co., 49 Wash. 359, 95 Pac. 261(1908).
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proceeding or by a bona fide creditors' committee or representative of
creditors.
This subsection provides some standards which very much diminish
the hazards otherwise created by the requirement of Section 9-504 (2)
that disposition be handled in a "commercially reasonable" manner.
Armed with these standards, the secured party and his lawyer can
approach most disposition problems with considerable confidence.
The standards appear to be sensible and workable.
CONCLUSION
The emphasis in this paper has been primarily on the content of
"Article 9 and contrasts with the existing Washington law. The details
have been many and the forest may well have vanished in an over-
abundance of trees. It therefore seems appropriate to conclude with
some general observations which may be of assistance in the formula-
tion, by Washington readers, of judgments about the value of Article 9.
What of Article 9 as an example of statutory drafting? There are
passages in which the meaning is less than crystal clear; the significant
terminology is largely new;2 . cross-references are common and make
for complexity in organization and difficulty in deriving many of the
ultimate answers.
On the other hand, the language and composition are for the most
part admirably clear.
A new terminology is essential; the only way in which security
transactions can be freed from the incubus of uncertainty and con-
fusion which now curses them is to create a new terminology, one
which makes it impossible (or at least very difficult) to decide problems
which arise under Article 9 by resort to the old law rather than by
resort to the Article. Retention of the old words would create an
excessive hazard that the content of those words might creep into the
practice under the Code.
The annoyance of cross-references is payment for precision. The
price is not too big. The end-result is simplicity in operation. More-
over, use of the Code will quickly develop the familiarity with content
and organization which dissipates the initial difficulty in researching
in it.
I suggest that the Article merits high ranking as an example of
statutory drafting. Considering the scope, diversity and intractability
280 See the discussion of definitions at pp. 12 et seq. and 20, supra.
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of the subject matter, it is a near-miracle that Article 9 was done
so well.
What of the intrinsic worth of Article 9? The existing legal ma-
chinery for handling security transactions is deficient in that it is
unduly complex, is uncertain in various critical details, and fails to
provide practicable solutions for many worthwhile and proper financing
needs. Article 9 goes a long way toward remedying each of these
deficiencies.
Simplicity both in the technics by which security transactions are
created and in the mechanics of filing is achieved by the Article. This
is accomplished by the provision for one basic type of security, for
which the requisite is a short and simple document or a change in
possession, and by the provision for notice-filing.28 1
Certainty is fostered in a number of ways. Elimination of the risk
of ambiguity in the drafting and of the attendant filing-statute hazards,
is one.2 2 Specification of conflict of laws propositions is another;2 3 in
particular, coverage in detail of the legal situation upon removal of
the collateral to Washington from elsewhere, or vice versa, solves a
routine conflicts problem which is now not perfectly certain of solu-
tion.2 " There are other instances of enhanced certainty to be found
in the provisions which determine the meaning of the word "value,"""
which govern future advance clauses228 and future property clauses,8 "
which regulate security interests in motor vehicles,2 ' which define the
consequences of changes in the identity of the subject matter,29 which
prescribe the accounting rights of the security holder,2' ° which fix the
legal relations when collateral is affixed to land or to other chattels,4 1
and which tell us the extent to which a security assignee takes subject
to the obligor's cross-actions against the assignor.
It is of course not suggested that Article 9 would resolve all problems
or remove all uncertainty.48
231 See the discussion supra at pp. 5, 24, 197, 198, and the discussion of Sec. 9-401
e 2 seq.
282 See the discussion at p. 5 upra.
288 See the discussion at pp. 6 and 7 supra.
234 See the discussion at p. 10 supra.
288 See the discussion at p. 17 .supra.
287 See the discussion at pp. 23 and 232 supra.
287 See the discussion at pp. 29 and 212 .upra.8 See the discussion at pp. 210 and 212 .upra.
289 See the discussion at p. 237 jupra.
040 See the discussion at pp. 35, 36, and 218 et seq. "upra.
241 See the discussion at pp. 234 et seq. supra.
242 See the discussion at footnote 170, page 239, supra.
24 See for example the discussion of usury at p. 22 supra; of the bill of sale when
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Several of the provisions of Article 9 would extend the area within
which collateral can be safely taken, either by removing or diminishing
hazards now present or by creating a new technic. Examples are found
in the provision which attributes to future property the value previ-
ously provided by the lender,"' in the combination of future advance,
future property and accounting provisions which permit the accom-
plishment of a "floating charge," ' in the relief from serious fraudulent
conveyance difficulties, 4 ' and in increased flexibility in handling short-
term247 and secondary financing.'"
There are no doubt other details which the reader would include,
were he assembling a list of points at which simplicity, certainty, and
augmented opportunities for security transaction-use are Article 9
products.
The enumerated advantages weigh, in the aggregate, very heavily.
It is suggested that they out-weigh any claimed disadvantages, and
out-weigh them so surely and so much that on balance Article 9 must
be recognized as a great step forward.
No attempt will be made to spell out here the impact of Article 9
on different types of lender or borrower. The reader whose interest
is particularly in crop financing or appliance financing or motor vehicle
financing or inventory financing or secondary financing of consumer-
goods security transactions or of accounts receivable will no doubt
wish to work out for himself the details which bear directly on his
field of interest." '
There are a few places at which the position of each of us, in our
capacity as a buyer of goods, would be bettered, and these are indi-
cated in the footnote.0"
used for security, at p. 27 .upra; of chattel paper at p. 207 supra; and of "return" at
footnote 132, page 224 supra.
244 See the discussion at p. 19 supra. It cannot be said with assurance that this Code
provision would be controlling in the event of the debtor's bankruptcy, on the prefer-
ence issue.
245 See the discussion at pp. 29 and 30 "upra.
246 See the discussion at p. 33 supra.
2147 See the discussion at p. 33 supra.
248 See the discussion at pp. 207 eL seq. supra.
248a Such an inquiry is much aided by the study prepared by Harold Birnbaum; see
the concluding reference in Appendix II, infra.
249 The limitations on warranty-waiver (see the discussion at p. 38 .upra); the
provision by which the buyer of inventory takes free of security interests (see the dis-
cussion at pp. 226 and 227 supra) ; prohibition of forfeitures in contrast with the
existing conditional sales contract situation in Washington (see the discussion at
footnotes 202 and 203 supra). Concededly this last point may strike some persons as
a disadvantage to security-holders. It is suggested that such a view is short-sighted.
Any legal proposition which enables a seller or lender to inflict a forfeiture of interest
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Persons who extend unsecured credit (a group which will include
many who also extend secured credit) would find their position im-
proved in a number of ways. The unsecured creditor could better
determine his credit policy because the existence of security interests
in the customer's assets could be ascertained with greater ease and
assurance aso The peculiar risks posed for general creditors by the
equitable pledge principles now extant would be eliminated. 5' The
legal position of representatives of unsecured creditors with relation
to unperfected transfers is expressly and favorably stated in Article
9.1" Some types of business which now operate on an unsecured-credit
basis might find it practicable to take security. The fact that the entire
economy would be strengthened, selling costs diminished and business
fostered by improvement in the legal frame-work available for handling
security transactions, is also of direct concern to unsecured creditors.
Little emphasis has been given, in this paper, to the factor of uni-
formity in the laws of the several states. It would be unfortunate to
become so pre-occupied with the effect of Article 9 on the local law
and practice as to lose sight of the uniformity aspect of the Code.
Differences in the statutes and case law which govern security transac-
tions throughout the country are numerous. The ending of these dif-
ferences, which lay on commerce an obvious and unjustifiable burden
of risk and expense, would be beneficial to everyone.
APPENDIX I
Repeal of the following statutes, which conflict with Article 9, would be
necessary were the Unifoi n Commercial Code enacted in Washington:
RCW Ch. 61.04, Chattel Mortgages
RCW Ch. 61.08, Foreclosure of Chattel Mortgages
RCW Ch. 61.20, Trust Receipts
RCW Ch. 63.12, Conditional Sales Contracts
RCW Ch. 63.16, Assignment of Accounts Receivable
on the debtor is bad law, bad public relations and incompatible with the fundamental
Anglo-American ideal of fair play. The fact that a finance company or bank may
occasionally make money on a repossession is as poor a reason as can be advanced for
retention of the existing conditional sale contract remedies. Nor is there any relevancy
in the fact that some repossessions result in losses for which the profitable ones provide
an off-set. The proper counter for the risk of loss is a tighter credit "policy, not
penalization of some other vendee who defaults after building up an equity in the
property.250 See the discussion of Sec. 9-401.
231 See the discussion at pp. 25, 34 and footnote 214, page 217 supra.
252 See the discussion at p. 200 upra.
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Amendment of the following statutes would be desirable, were the Uniform
Commercial Code enacted in Washington:
RCW Ch. 46.12, Motor Vehicles (see notes 91 and 92 supra, and the dis-
cussion in the body at note 97 supra).
RCW Title 60, Liens (see the discussion at note 150 supra).
RCW Ch. 61.16, Assignment and Satisfaction of Mortgages.
It would be desirable to consider the enactment of new legislation in the
following areas, were the Uniform Commercial Code enacted in Wash-
ington:
Legislation authorizing and regulating a combined land and chattel fore-
closure procedure (see the didcussion under Section 501 (4) supra).
Legislation regulating wage assignments (see the discussion under Sec-
tion 9-104 (d) supra).
Consideration should be given to the financing charge, in the area now
occupied by the Conditional Sale Contract, and to the propriety of new
usury legislation which would preclude the development of controversy
about the carry-over of Hafer v. Spaeth, 22 Wn.2d 378, 156 P.2d 408
(1945). (See the discussion under Section 9-201, supra page 22.)
APPENDIX II
(BIBLIOGRAPHY)
Caveat--changes in the provisions or language of the Code have been made
since some of the articles cited below were published.
In addition to those cited supra page 3, n. 3, the following discussions of
the Conflicts propositions which appear in the Code are of interest:
Dean, Conflict of Laws under the Uniform Commercial Code: The Case for
Federal Enactment, 6 VAN. L.R. 479
Smith, Conflicts and Chaos or Contract and Uniformity: The Uniform
Commercial Code, 2 Kan. L.R. 11
Discussions of all or elements of Article 9 appear in the following:
Bane, Chattel Security Comes of Age: Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 1 DE PAUL L. REv. 91
Birnbaum, Article 9-A Restatement and Revision of Chattel Security,
1952 Wis. L. REv. 348
Bunn, Financing Dealers-Existing Wisconsin Law and the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 37 MARQ. L. REv. 197
Bunn, Financing Farmers: Existing Kansas Law and the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 2 KAN. L. REv. 225
Comment, Article 9-Secured Transactions, Sales of Accounts, Contract
Rights, and Chattel Paper, 17 ALB. L. REv. 145
Comment, Article Nine-Secured Transactions, 22 TENN. L. REv. 848
Comment, Liability of the Transferor of Non-negotiable Instruments under
the Proposed Commercial Code, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 213
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Comment, Secured Consumer Goods Transactions under New York Law
and the Commercial Code, 2 BuFF. L. REv. 297
Countryman, The Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial Code
and Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, 16 LAW & C.P. 76
Dunham, Inventory and Accounts Receivable Financing, 62 HARV. L. REv'
588
Everett, Securing Security, 16 LAw & C.P. 49
Freedheim and Goldston, Article 9 and Security Interests in Accounts,
Contract Rights and Chattel Paper, 14 OHIo STATE L.J. 69
Gilmore, The Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial Code, 16
LAW & C.P. 27
Hunt and Coates, The Impact of the Secured Transactions Article on Com-
mercial Practices with Respect to Agricultural Financing, 16 LAW &
C.P. 165
Ireton, The Prop.osed Commercial Code: A New Deal in Chattel Security,
43 ILL. L. REV. 794
Kripke, Chattel Paper as a Negotiable Specialty under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 59 YALE L.J. 1209
Kripke, The Modernization of Commercial Security under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 16 LAW & C.P. 183
Kripke, The "Secured Transactions" Provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 35 VA. L. Rav. 577
Note: Procedural Preview of Secured Transactions of Consumer Goods
Currently and under the Proposed Commercial Code, 1952 Wis. L. REv.
730
Note: Validity of Prohibitions Against Assignments-The Caristo Case and
the Commercial Code, 1952 Wis. L. REv. 740
Schwartz, Pennsylvania Chattel Security and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 530
Tanner, A Study of the Uniform Commercial Code on Commercial Trans-
fers, 58 DICK. L. REv. 35
Townsend, The Case of the Mysterious Assessory, 16 LAW & C.P. 197
Starting in 6 QUARTERLY REPORT ABA CONFERENCE ON PERSONAL Fi-
NANCE LAW at p. 4 and continuing on into volume 7, is a discussion of
various aspects of Article 9. These papers have been reprinted in a
SPECIAL BULLETIN BY THE NATIONAL COMMERCIAL FINANCE CONFER-
ENCE, INC. (dated May 25, 1953). The authors and subjects are:
Birnbaum, Introduction
Kripke, "Security Agreement" and Rights of Original Parties
Ireton, Priorities and Rights of Third Parties
Kupfer, Filing Provisions
Gilmore, Default
There is also in this series of papers a debate on the subject, Does the
Commercial Code Upset the Balance Between Secured and Unsecured
1954]
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Creditors?, Friend writing for the affirmative and Livingston for the
negative.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has
published a pamphlet entitled THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, con-
taining at page 5 a discussion entitled "Informed Comment on the Code,"
and at page 16 a discussion entitled "Mr. Emmett F. Smith's Attack
Answered."
The Committee on Continuing Legal Education, of the American Law Insti-
tute, has published a detailed analysis of Article 9, prepared by Harold F.
Birnbaum. It is contained in two small volumes entitled SECURED
TRANSACTIONS UNDER TEE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, and is par-
ticularly helpful to an understanding of the effect of the Code on the
different types of business situation which the Code would govern.
